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 Institutional Boundaries and  
Judicial Review —  
Some Thoughts on How the Court is 
Going About Its Business: 
Desperately Seeking Coherence 
Danielle Pinard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The debate concerning the legitimacy of judicial review will never 
end, we may as well face it.  
Much discussion has been devoted to determining whether judicial 
activism or judicial restraint plays a more prominent role in constitu-
tional litigation. The debate usually focuses on the conclusion reached 
by a judge, activism being associated with the striking down of legisla-
tion and restraint with its validation. To a certain extent, the debate so 
understood could be reduced to numbers, proportions, and statistics 
concerned exclusively with outcomes in constitutional litigation.  
Yet one cannot escape the impression that the debate about judicial 
activism is actually concerned with social values rather than with mere 
statistics, and it is tempting, yet perhaps hazardous, to associate activism 
with progressiveness, and restraint with conservatism.  
Furthermore, these notions of progressiveness and conservatism can 
be understood as referring to institutional boundaries between state 
actors, or alternatively, to the political character of the decision reached.  
With regard to institutional boundaries, a conservative conception 
insists on the democratic legitimacy of parliaments regarding social 
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policies, and requires a general approach of judicial non-interference, 
save in clear cases of constitutional invalidity.  
But in reality, it is the very nature of the legislation itself, its social, 
progressive, or conservative quality, that dictates the labelling of the 
outcome following its constitutional challenge. A judicial declaration of 
constitutional validity can be progressive, while the striking down of 
legislation can be conservative. It will depend on the object of the con-
stitutional litigation, that is, the social value of the impugned legislative 
choice. It is therefore misleading to blindly associate judicial activism 
with progressiveness and judicial restraint with conservatism. It depends 
on the historical, social, and political context.  
Ultimately, it comes down to the political preferences of the ob-
server. The qualification of a political choice as conservative or progres-
sive is highly and inherently subjective.  
However, a consideration of how judges proceed, of judicial meth-
odology rather than conclusions, can shed a different light on the discus-
sion of judicial activism and restraint in constitutional litigation.  
Judicial restraint, as understood in its methodological aspect, can 
involve an exclusive focus on the text of the impugned statute, as op-
posed to a consideration of empirical realities; or again passive observa-
tion of the litigation and mere acknowledgement of the evidence 
adduced by the parties, leading to an objective discovery of whether or 
not the burden of proof has been discharged. The judge takes note of 
this fact but makes no judgment, and has no involvement in the matter. 
The legislator’s unverified factual hypotheses are taken for granted. 
Understood in procedural terms, the judge acting with restraint has no 
impact on the result. She observes, discovers, but does not act. Accord-
ing to this logic, for example, it is section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 
19821 that renders laws unconstitutional, and not the ruling of the 
judges.2  
The activist judge, at this methodological level, fully participates in 
the debate. She goes beyond the study of the legislative provisions, 
                                                                                                                                
1 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.  
2 “The invalidity of a legislative provision inconsistent with the Charter does not arise 
from the fact of its being declared unconstitutional by a court, but from the operation of 
s. 52(1)”: Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin (sub nom. Nova Scotia 
(Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, at para. 28, [2003] S.C.J. 
No. 54 [hereinafter “Martin”].  
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ventures into the empirical world. She needs to understand the way the 
world works in order to be able to correctly rule on the constitutional 
validity of a statute. She does not feel constrained by the factual conclu-
sions underlying legislative action. She makes her own exploration of 
factual issues and uses a very wide notion of judicial notice.  
However, the strongest case of judicial activism with respect to 
methodology, it seems to me, flows from unpredictability of approach. 
It is a powerful form of activism, the last word for the judges. It is the 
power to decide and modify methodological requirements as cases arise 
and unfold. It is the power to pave the way to the desired result, to the 
chosen destination. It is powerful, maybe to some extent unavoidable, 
and it is dangerous. I readily acknowledge that one should not make too 
much of “conceptual elegance.”3 But, as has been written, “[w]hile 
imprecision in the substantive law may potentially affect a certain seg-
ment of our society, vagueness in legal methodology has effects that 
pervade the entire judicial system in its broadest sense and are accord-
ingly felt by society as a whole.”4 One should not forget “the social cost 
of continued uncertainty in the law”.5  
This article will discuss some of the more problematic aspects of le-
gal methodology. It will address an ambivalent judicial attitude with 
regard to the factual component of constitutional adjudication in Part II, 
some uncertainty as to the object of judicial review (whether it is the 
rule or the statutory provision expressing it) in Part III, and finally, some 
confusion between two stages of judicial review that should be kept 
conceptually distinct (the interpretation of the impugned statute and the 
determination of constitutional remedies) in Part IV.  
II.  AN AMBIVALENT JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TO FACTS  
The role of facts is a peculiar feature of Canadian constitutional ad-
judication. Facts are ill-treated by the Supreme Court of Canada. They 
                                                                                                                                
3 “Mere administrative expediency or conceptual elegance cannot be sufficiently 
pressing and substantial to override a Charter right.” Martin, supra, note 2, at para. 110.  
4 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, in 2747-3174 Québec Inc. v. Québec (Régie des permis 
d’alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919, at para. 150, [1996] S.C.J. No. 112. 
5 Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 
21, [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, citing Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, 
at 362, [1989] S.C.J. No. 14, referring to uncertainty as to the available Charter remedies. 
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are refused, ignored, called for, wished for, found in evidence, not found 
in evidence, imagined, invented, assumed, judicially noticed, reasoned, 
or taken for granted. They are treated in an unpredictable way. And yet 
they are extremely useful, for their presence or their absence, and their 
uncertainty or their insufficiency is used to justify judgments. It is not 
the fault of the law, it is not the fault of the judges, it is the fault of the 
facts.  
The entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms6 has given rise to an explicit judicial concern for facts. Indeed, 
prior to the Charter, Canadian constitutional adjudication had for the 
most part been preoccupied with questions of law, and with the interpre-
tation of statutes and of constitutional provisions, and the formal evalua-
tion of their consistency. The consistency of a legislative provision with 
the Constitution was considered to be a question of law, actually “the 
most fundamental question of law one could conceive.”7 Some litigants 
were even punished for bringing facts to the Court.8 If the Anti-Inflation 
Reference9 has been seen by some as a turning point, it is in reality the 
entrenchment of fundamental rights that has brought about a significant, 
if not paradigmatic, change in judicial methodology.  
Indeed, early in the history of Charter litigation, the Supreme Court 
of Canada called for facts and for explicitly defined burdens of proof.  
It is the responsibility of the party invoking a violation of rights and 
freedoms to prove its assertion. The Court will not make decisions in a 
factual vacuum, and insists “upon the careful preparation and presenta-
tion of a factual basis in most Charter cases,”10 because “[t]he presenta-
tion of facts ... is essential to a proper consideration of Charter issues.”11  
As a general rule, the party invoking the reasonableness of limits 
imposed upon rights will be required to bring “cogent and persuasive” 
evidence to that effect.12 
                                                                                                                                
6 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of Constitution  Act, 1982, supra, 
note 1 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
7 Martin, at para. 28; the remark was made, however, in the context of a Charter liti-
gation.  
8 See Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 325, where the appellant was 
refused his costs for the preparation of a factum.  
9 Anti-Inflation Act, Re, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373.  
10 MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at 361, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88. 
11 Id. 
12 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 138, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7.  
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The Court thereby prescribes an essentially empirical approach to 
constitutional jurisprudence, enjoining parties who question the consti-
tutional validity of statutes to provide facts to support their claims, and 
Parliament to rely on explicit factual foundations for legislative choices 
that are likely to infringe upon rights and freedoms.  
This search for facts can rightly be seen as an indicator of judicial 
activism.13 Constitutional litigation can become an arena where courts 
require evidence that is not available, and therefore go beyond their 
institutional boundaries. 
Paradoxically, however, the emphasis on facts could lead to a trend 
of jurisprudence that presents itself as passive. For this evidence rhetoric 
enables the Court to declare that the violation has or has not been estab-
lished, or that the reasonable nature of the infringement has or has not 
been demonstrated. It can thus distance itself from the decision, or even 
refuse to take responsibility for it: the Court does not decide the exis-
tence of an infringement on rights or the reasonableness of limits im-
posed by the state, but rather it merely observes those extraneous and 
pre-existing realities, in light of the evidence presented.  
Aside from this sense of detachment, the reliance on a language of 
fact and evidence creates an illusion of certainty. The conclusion as to 
the existence of a violation of a given right can be expressed in terms of 
a factual observation. The consideration of the reasonableness of limits 
imposed on rights and freedoms is presented not as a subjective weigh-
ing of the social values at issue, but as an objective exercise in the as-
sessment of empirical data, correlations, and causal relationships 
established by scientific studies. This recourse to a language of facts 
therefore also creates an illusion of neutrality: judges’ values play no 
role in the objective analysis of data.  
Judicial handling of questions of law is explicit. We may agree or 
disagree with the outcome, but we have, in principle, access to the rele-
vant materials supporting the analysis, be it the text of a statute, the 
preliminary works, or the precedent cases. 
The judicial treatment of facts is less transparent. The typical reader 
of a Supreme Court decision did not attend the hearing, nor did she read 
                                                                                                                                
13 Rogovin refers to a jurisprudential trend in constitutional law that requires empirical 
justification as a kind of judicial activism: Wendy M. Rogovin, “The Politics of Facts: The 
Illusion of Certainty” (1995) 46 Hastings L.J. 1723, at 1726.  
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the transcripts. All she will know of the facts will be what the Court 
included in its judgment. This situation renders any critical analysis 
quite difficult and thereby empowers the judges. We have no choice but 
to accept what they say about facts.  
Moreover, constitutional litigation involves a particular species of 
facts. We are far from the traditional “who did what and when.”14 It 
brings into play the rights and wrongs of social phenomena, like the 
physical correction of children, marijuana use, chronic pain syndrome as 
a disability, or electoral processes. The truth can rarely be found in the 
establishment of those facts; ascertaining likelihood remains a more 
realistic aim.  
Facts concerning social realities are sometimes labelled social facts, 
or “legislative facts.” Despite the fact that they are in principle presented 
according to ordinary rules of evidence, the Supreme Court has ruled 
that they are subject to less stringent admissibility requirements,15 re-
garding, for example, judicial notice.16 However, the Court suggested 
caution when the question is reasonably open to dispute or could be 
dispositive of the case.17 Consequently, we are basically left in the dark 
as to how social facts actually find their way into judicial reasoning.  
In the past year, the Supreme Court made ample use of the inherent 
liberty it is afforded in the handling of social facts in constitutional 
cases. It discussed issues of electoral processes (see 1, following), mari-
juana use (see 2), physical correction of children (see 3), and chronic 
pain syndrome (see 4) in its own creative and unpredictable way. 
                                                                                                                                
14 The expression is from Davis, the father of the adjudicative/legislative facts distinc-
tion: K.C. Davis, “An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process” 
(1942) 55 Harvard L. Rev. 364, at 402-403.  
15 Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at 1099, [1990] S.C.J. 
No. 92. 
16 R. v. Malmo-Levine (sub nom. R. v. Caine), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 28, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 79 [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”].  
17 Id.  
(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) Boundaries and Review 219 
 
1. Figueroa: Facts about Electoral Processes 
In Figueroa,18 the Court had to decide whether the rules of the Can-
ada Elections Act,19 prescribing that political parties had to nominate 
candidates in at least 50 electoral districts to qualify for certain benefits, 
were consistent with the democratic rights protected by section 3 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Fourteen years previously, the Court had refused to answer constitu-
tional questions concerning certain rules of the Elections Finances Act,20 
which provided that the province would refund a portion of the cam-
paign expenses of those candidates and parties with a fixed proportion 
of the votes in provincial elections.21 The decision was justified on the 
basis of lack of evidence, and the Court took the opportunity to strongly 
emphasize the importance, if not the necessity, of presenting a factual 
basis for Charter litigations, and warned that in some cases, it would 
actually be irresponsible for the Court to attempt to resolve constitu-
tional issues without a reasonable factual background.22 The Court criti-
cized the fact that submissions pertaining to the financing of political 
parties and the effect of contributions to campaign expenses were not 
supported by empirical findings.23  
Consequently, it seemed reasonable to start reading Figueroa with 
the expectation of learning something about the practical effects of the 
50-candidates limit. For example, one could have hoped to have found 
in the judgment some information about the kind of parties or ideologies 
that were de facto excluded from the statutory advantages. However, no 
such information can be found in the judgment.  
The Supreme Court judgment contains no express discussion of fac-
tual issues and no formal presentation of evidence, nor does it refer to 
the fact-finding conclusions in the courts below. Figueroa is essentially 
an exercise in abstract reasoning on democratic values; for example, on 
the notion of “effective representation.” The Court considers that the 
                                                                                                                                
18 Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, [2003] S.C.J. No. 37 
[hereinafter “Figuerroa”]. I will mainly discuss the majority’s opinion. The three judges from 
Quebec wrote a distinct concurring opinion. 
19 R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2. 
20 S.M. 1982-83-84, c. 45 [now R.S.M. 1987, c. E32]. 
21 MacKay v. Manitoba, supra, note 10, at 361. 
22 Id., at 366.  
23 Id.  
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two relevant questions to establish the existence of a section 3 violation 
are whether members and supporters of those parties who don’t meet the 
50-candidates threshold play a meaningful role in the electoral process, 
and whether the statutory restrictions at issue interfere with their capac-
ity to play that meaningful role.24 The Court seems to “reason” the facts, 
in an abstract and formalistic way. The Court writes about the relevant 
issues not in terms of empirical realities, but at the level of political 
philosophy discourse. The following affirmations illustrate the gist of 
the discussion of factual issues found in the judgment: 
Large or small, all political parties are capable of introducing unique 
interests and concerns into the political discourse. Consequently, all 
political parties, whether large or small, are capable of acting as a 
vehicle for the participation of individual citizens in the public 
discourse that animates the determination of social policy.25  
Once again, the capacity of a political party to provide individual 
citizens with an opportunity to express an opinion on governmental 
policy and the proper functioning of public institutions is not 
dependent upon its capacity to participate in the governance of the 
country subsequent to an election.26 
It is thus my conclusion that the members and supporters of political 
parties that nominate candidates in fewer than 50 electoral districts do 
play a meaningful role in the electoral process.27 
Many individuals are unaware of the personal identity or background 
of the candidate for whom they wish to vote. In the absence of a party 
identifier on the ballot paper, it is possible that certain voters will be 
unable to vote for their preferred candidate.28  
In our system of democracy, the political platform of an individual 
candidate is closely aligned with the political platform of the party 
with which she or he is affiliated, and thus the listing of party 
affiliation has a significant informational component.29  
                                                                                                                                
24 Figueroa, supra, note 18, at para. 38. 
25 Id., at para. 41. 
26 Id., at para. 44.  
27 Id., at para. 46. 
28 Id., at para. 56. 
29 Id., at para. 57. 
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I want to stress here that my point is not that the Court is right or 
wrong in making these assertions. It is rather that, in the larger context 
of a jurisprudential approach requiring the parties to present their consti-
tutional arguments on an evidentiary foundation, one can be legitimately 
surprised to encounter in the judgment so many abstractly reasoned 
facts.  
I am not suggesting either that those factual affirmations were not 
based on evidence. Maybe they were. However the outside observer 
does not know, for the Court does not say.  
Interestingly, the first allusions to evidence relate to its insuffi-
ciency. The Court first expressly discusses evidentiary issues when it 
evaluates the reasonableness of the limits imposed on democratic rights, 
within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter. After having confirmed 
that the burden of justification rests on the government, the Court al-
ludes, more than once, to justificatory arguments that were not sup-
ported by evidence. Indeed, on numerous occasions, the Court will 
stress that elements presented by the government were not supported by 
evidence. Even though the Court concludes its section 1 analysis with a 
remark that gives the impression that it might have been satisfied with 
argumentation as much as with evidence,30 one cannot escape the con-
clusion that in reality hard evidence was required.  
The Court deplores, for example, the lack of evidence regarding the 
practical effect of the 50-candidates threshold on the cost-efficiency of 
the tax credit scheme,31 its potential benefit to the public purse,32 or its 
ability to prevent “third parties or lobby groups from nominating candi-
dates for the sole purpose of obtaining the right to issue tax receipts for 
donations received outside the campaign period.”33 The Court regrets 
                                                                                                                                
30 Id., at para. 89: “The government has not advanced sufficient evidence to demon-
strate that the election of a majority government would result in benefits that outweigh the 
deleterious effects associated with legislation that violates s. 3 for the purpose of ensuring that 
the electoral process results in the election of a government that would not otherwise be 
elected. Nor has it provided a reasoned basis on which to conclude that this is the case. In the 
absence of either evidence or argument to this effect, it is impossible to conclude that the 
legislation is justifiable in a free and democratic society.”  
31 Id., at para. 68. 
32 Id., at para. 70. 
33 Id., at para. 76. In this paragraph, the French version is clearer in it being a require-
ment of evidence, and not simply of demonstration, that could, arguably, be abstract or 
logical.  
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that no evidence was provided to demonstrate that the obligation to 
submit audited financial statements, audited financial transactions re-
turns, and audited election expenses returns was ineffective in prevent-
ing third parties from seeking registered party status for the sole purpose 
of abusing the tax credit scheme.34 The Court takes notice of the lack of 
evidence concerning the influence of the threshold on the phenomenon 
of majority building or majority government, in that there was no evi-
dence either of the threshold promoting it35 or of the absence of the 
threshold preventing it.36 Even more importantly, the Court notes the 
absence of evidence that minority “governments are less democratic 
than majority governments, or that they provide less effective govern-
ance than majority governments.”37  
The Court seems to require the impossible: evidence of things that 
cannot be proved. Three judges who wrote separate opinions remarked 
on that aspect, questioning, among other things, “how one could prove 
empirically that one form of government is better than another.”38 
The treatment of facts in constitutional cases is determined by vague 
rules, more guidelines, actually, as they were saying in the popular 
movie Pirates of The Caribbean. So the empirical trend in jurisprudence 
gives considerable liberty to the judges. The Supreme Court widely used 
it in Figueroa. It reasoned the facts necessary to come to a conclusion of 
violation of rights. And it regretted the lack of factual justification for 
such a limitation.  
Such reasoning of facts, and such expressions of dismay regarding 
what is said to be a lack of evidence of necessary justificatory elements, 
certainly play an important rhetorical role. The conclusion has nothing 
to do with the political preferences of the judges; it has to do with the 
facts, especially with the government not having discharged its burden. 
It permits what I would call a “not our fault” type of reasoning.  
                                                                                                                                
34 Id., at para. 76. 
35 Id., at para. 85. 
36 Id., at para. 86. 
37 Id., at para. 81. 
38 Id., at para. 181. 
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2. Malmo-Levine: Facts about Marijuana Use 
Malmo-Levine, a case relating to the constitutionality of the crime of 
possession of marijuana, is another interesting example of how the Su-
preme Court handles facts in constitutional cases. The majority decided 
that there was no violation of constitutional rights, and therefore it did 
not have to resort to the section 1 analysis. The burden of proof conse-
quently rested on the parties asserting a violation of constitutional 
rights, and not on the state.  
“The question before us is purely a matter of law,” the majority of 
the Court wrote from the outset.39 This kind of affirmation helps the 
Court to keep its distance from the factual component of the case at 
hand. Facts are required, but may be discarded. Yet the Court always 
has the last word on questions of law.  
It is, however, a case supported by what seems to be a considerable 
factual record. A 22-paragraph section entitled “Evidence of Harm” 
presents considerable factual material concerning what the Court calls 
“[t]he evidentiary issue at the core of the appellants’ constitutional chal-
lenge,” that is, the “harm principle” and the argument that possession is 
a victimless crime.40 
One finds in that section admissions by the parties, and conclusions 
from the Le Dain Report,41 from the trial judge in Caine42 and from 
Parliamentary reports.  
M. Malmo-Levine and others made limited admissions as to the 
harm caused by marijuana. Yet the mere idea of admission of social 
facts is bizarre. Whether or not social facts exist, they do so outside the 
courtroom, life, and personal experience of the parties. They are difficult 
to prove, or to identify with precision; scientists work hard attempting to 
ascertain even some aspects of them. How can an “admission” of those 
facts make them truer, or more real? How can two parties at trial admit 
and settle a controversial factual issue over which the scientific commu-
nity is still struggling? I understand that it is convenient, for the purpose 
of judicial fact-finding. Yet ontologically, it does not make sense. One 
                                                                                                                                
39 Malmo-Levine, supra, note 16, at para. 23. 
40 Id., at para. 40. 
41 Canada, Cannabis: A Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical 
Use of Drugs (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972) [hereinafter “Le Dain Report”]. 
42 R. v. Caine, [1998] B.C.J. No. 885 (Prov. Ct.), aff’d (2000), 138 B.C.A.C. 218. 
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should only be authorized to admit to those facts of which one has per-
sonal knowledge.  
From the Le Dain Report, the Court considers the four identified 
“major areas of social concern.”43 It is unclear whether concerns ex-
pressed can be considered proven facts. Does an expression of concern, 
be it from the Le Dain Report as to “the role played by cannabis in the 
development and spread of multi-drug use”44 prove anything? 
The trial judge’s findings in Caine, on the basis of “the extensive 
evidence before her court,”45 constitute the third source of evidence of 
harm. It is a more orthodox one.  
Finally, the Court considered “a number of parliamentary reports is-
sued since the decision of the courts below,”46 about which it stated that 
it “may and do[es] take judicial notice.”47 This idea of taking judicial 
notice of parliamentary reports is ambiguous. It could mean judicial 
notice of their existence, or of the facts they assert. The latter would be 
far-fetched, since the facts they state are not necessarily notorious, and 
may be the subject of dispute among reasonable persons.48  
                                                                                                                                
43 Malmo-Levine, supra, note 16, at para. 44.  
44 Id. 
45 Id., at para. 46.  
46 Id., at para. 54. 
47 Id. Justice Arbour did not use this new evidence. Instead, she deferred to the trial 
courts’ findings, “absent a patent and overriding error on their part,” at para. 191. With regard 
to those evidentiary issues, she had a very classical approach. She wrote: “We have to analyse 
the constitutional questions raised in these appeals on the basis of these facts [findings of fact 
by lower courts]. Although criminalization of marihuana is a sensitive political issue and 
raises many social policy considerations, our analysis is circumscribed by the findings of fact 
of the trial judges, which are well-supported by an extensive record. These findings are the 
basis upon which we must decide whether, or to what extent, Parliament may criminalize 
under threat of imprisonment possession of marihuana for personal use and, alternatively, for 
the purpose of trafficking. We must determine whether, on the basis of these facts, constitu-
tional requirements are met, with respect to both the division of powers issue and the Charter 
considerations,” at para. 201. “I do not think that we need to come to our own assessment of 
the facts,” she added at para. 191. A similar kind of orthodox deference to the fact-finding in 
lower courts can be found in the Court’s opinion in R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 43, where, in a very short judgment of 55 paragraphs, one finds no less than 14 
express confirmations of the trial judge’s treatment of facts.  
48 “Facts which are (a) so notorious as not to be the subject of dispute among reason-
able persons, or (b) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resorting to readily 
accessible sources of indisputable accuracy, may be noticed by the court without proof of 
them by any party.”: John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman & Alan W. Bryant, The Law of 
Evidence in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) at 1055. 
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But the weaknesses inherent in the foundation of the “evidence” 
considered in Malmo-Levine do not seem to be damaging to, or even 
significant for, the reasoning of the Court. Actually, it seems that, once 
again, beyond appearances, the facts do not play a very important role in 
the ultimate decision. Indeed, once it is accepted that the use of mari-
juana can cause limited damage to certain vulnerable groups in society, 
a conclusion that does not seem to be particularly controversial, the real 
argument concerns the legal importance and significance of this harm. It 
becomes an exercise in value judgment, a matter for discussion, argu-
mentation, and decision. The answer will not be found in the evidence. 
It will involve a choice, made by a legitimate social actor.  
The core of the judicial decision was the importance attributed to 
this kind of harm and the role it plays in the criminal law setting,49 or as 
a possible principle of fundamental justice.50 Those are questions of law 
and of abstract reasoning about criminal law, and have nothing to do 
with empirical discoveries. Indeed, the central aspect of the decision 
seems to be the value judgment associated with the importance and 
significance of the limited “harm” involved with the use of marijuana. 
The decision of the Court, to the effect that Parliament was entitled to 
exercise its criminal law power on the basis of a reasonable apprehen-
sion of harm, and its determination that the harm principle did not con-
stitute a principle of fundamental justice, settled the appeal. It is 
impossible to imagine any kind of evidence that could have resulted in a 
different conclusion. The Court was right: it answered a question of law, 
and the facts, though called for as a general rule, could change nothing 
in the final outcome.  
The whole factual decor is nevertheless a powerful rhetorical de-
vice. The Court had called for facts, and had even adjourned the appeal 
                                                                                                                                
49 The Court did indeed write that, under its criminal law power, “Parliament is enti-
tled to act … on reasoned apprehension of harm.” Malmo-Levine, supra, note 16, at para. 78. 
No important evidence will therefore be required.  
50 Once the Court decided that the “harm principle” was not a principle of fundamental 
justice within the meaning of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (para. 
111), the evidence concerning the actual harm caused by the use of marijuana loses relevance. 
Contra: Arbour J., at para. 244: “I am of the view that the principles of fundamental justice 
require that whenever the state resorts to imprisonment, a minimum of harm to others must be 
an essential part of the offence,” and, at para. 256: “[H]arm to self does not satisfy the consti-
tutional requirement that whenever the state resorts to imprisonment, there must be a mini-
mum harm to others as an essential part of the offence.”  
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in order to be able to benefit from legislative fact-finding.51 The presen-
tation of a factual background may give the illusion of certainty; it may 
give the judgment the appearance of objective legitimacy. From the 
outset, one finds in the majority opinion, the following affirmations: 
“[a]ll sides agree that marihuana is a psychoactive drug which ‘causes 
alteration of mental function’ … Certain groups in society share a par-
ticular vulnerability to its effects.”52 It looks more like an introduction to 
a medical treatise on drugs than the beginning of a judgment on the 
constitutionality of a criminal prohibition. The Court presented facts and 
demonstrated that it was well-informed and understood what it was 
writing about. The Court then proceeded with its value judgments. It is a 
case where the “empirical observation served a rhetorical purpose, being 
pertinent only insofar as it advanced [the] interpretive judgment, and 
empirical evidence to the contrary would surely not have influenced the 
outcome.”53 
3.  Canadian Foundation: Facts about Physical Correction of 
Children 
The second paragraph of the Court’s judgment in Canadian Foun-
dation for Children, Youth & the Law54 tells us that a “substantial social 
consensus on what is reasonable correction, supported by comprehen-
sive and consistent expert evidence on what is reasonable presented in 
this appeal, gives clear content to s. 43,” the Criminal Code55 provision 
justifying certain forms of physical correction to children. One therefore 
has the legitimate impression that by reading the judgment of the Court 
one will learn about the social phenomenon of the physical discipline of 
                                                                                                                                
51 The Court had even written an interlocutory judgment Malmo-Levine v. R., Supreme 
Court of Canada, 13 December 2002, in which it adjourned the case. Aware that parliamen-
tarians would soon examine the issue of the social facts of interest to them in the case, the 
Court wrote that it would await their findings.  
52 Malmo-Levine, supra, note 16, at para. 3.  
53 David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Exploring the Empiri-
cal Component of Constitutional Interpretation” (1991) U. of Pa. L. Rev. 540, at 546, about a 
remark made by Chief Justice Marshall in 1824, to the effect that Americans understood the 
word “commerce” to include “navigation.”  
54 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth & the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, at para. 2, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6 [hereinafter “Canadian Foundation”]. 
55 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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children. One expects a judgment that meets the jurisprudential re-
quirement of presenting Charter litigation cases in a proper factual set-
ting. One is particularly hopeful, when one reads that “the record of 
expert testimony in this litigation is voluminous.”56  
Yet one learns very little about facts in Canadian Foundation. De-
spite the fact that from the beginning reference is made to a “substantial 
social consensus” and to “comprehensive and consistent expert evi-
dence,” nowhere in the judgment does one find a thorough presentation 
of the evidence, nor the fact-finding conclusions of the lower courts. 
Occasionally, some piece of evidence appears in the judgment, and with 
this, we must be satisfied.  
The majority judgment interprets the relevant provision of the 
Criminal Code in the light of a perceived social consensus and expert 
evidence.57 For example, there is apparently agreement among experts 
that corporal punishment of children under the age of two, and of teen-
agers, as well as the use of objects or slaps or blows to the head, are 
harmful.58 The Court supported this affirmation with a laconic reference 
to the trial decision. We are not told who those experts are, or where 
they published the results of their studies. We are simply told that these 
are the conclusions of expert research. We are told as well about the 
existence of a “contemporary social consensus” as to what teachers 
should be allowed to do.59 This information about social consensus, 
though of a factual nature, is not supported by any kind of authority, 
except the affirmation of the Supreme Court of Canada. It is simply 
stated.  
The proposed judicial interpretation of section 43 is supposedly le-
gitimized by expert evidence and social consensus, rather than by mere 
authority. The problem is that the expert evidence is not presented nor 
summarized, and the factual support for the assertion of a social consen-
sus is not expressed. Moreover, the affirmation of a social consensus is 
weakened by comments made by Arbour J., who, presumably on the 
basis of the same evidence, refered to the “ongoing debate in society 
about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the use of corporal 
                                                                                                                                
56 Canadian Foundation, supra, note 54, at para. 194.  
57 Id., at para. 36.  
58 Id., at para. 37.  
59 Id., at para. 38. 
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punishment by way of correction”60 and to the fact that judges them-
selves allude to “the lack of consensus in this area of the law,”61 and 
finally affirmed that “[c]orporal punishment is a controversial social 
issue.”62 
The majority of the Court affirmed the constitutional validity of the 
Criminal Code provision justifying the physical correction of children, 
as limited by the interpretation it suggests. The Court justified this par-
ticular interpretation with empirical facts regarding what is reasonable 
and corrective. It based its conclusion on what it said was the object of 
social and expert consensus. This rhetorical device is intended to give 
the illusion of certainty, and objectivity. The lack of explicit sources for 
those affirmations, however, dramatically weakens the argument.  
4. Martin: Facts About Chronic Pain Syndrome 
The introductory paragraph of the Martin and Laseur case creates 
the same expectation of learning important facts about chronic pain 
syndrome. A provincial regime of workers’ compensation was chal-
lenged as having violated the equality rights of workers with chronic 
pain syndrome. The Court wrote that the syndrome is “generally consid-
ered to be pain that persists beyond the normal healing time for the 
underlying injury or is disproportionate to such injury, and whose exis-
tence is not supported by objective findings at the site of the injury un-
der current medical techniques.”63 It added that “there is no doubt that 
chronic pain patients are suffering and in distress, and that the disability 
they experience is real.”64 This remark could be understood as taking for 
granted a fact in issue, that is, the existence of disability on the basis of 
chronic pain syndrome. In the context of a jurisprudential approach 
insisting on factual foundations for constitutional challenges, one could 
legitimately expect to learn more about the empirical reality of chronic 
pain syndrome. Despite the warning that courts are not “the appropriate 
forum for an evaluation of the available medical evidence concerning 
                                                                                                                                
60 Id., at para. 173. 
61 Id., at para. 182. 
62 Id., at para. 185.  
63 Martin, supra, note 2, at para. 1.  
64 Id.  
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chronic pain for general scientific purposes,”65 one could at least hope to 
gain a bit of knowledge about this syndrome, for “legal purposes.” Here 
again, one will be disappointed, and to a certain extent, one will feel 
cheated.  
As was the case in Canadian Foundation, Martin lacks a formal 
presentation of the evidence available to the Court, and of the fact-
finding conclusions of lower courts. Bits and pieces of factual informa-
tion emerge sporadically, apparently as required. For example, the Court 
laconically refered to “the limited evidence before [it].”66 Or it alluded 
to medical reports that mention inaccurate negative assumptions toward 
chronic pain sufferers,67 that recognize the psychological component of 
the syndrome68 or which conclude that “chronic pain frequently evolves 
into a permanent and debilitating condition.”69 We learn at the end of 
the judgment that the Court had “considerable scientific evidence com-
missioned by ... workers’ compensation boards.”70 We find out that the 
evidence did not reveal that a significant financial burden was imposed 
on the provincial fund by chronic pain syndrome claimants.71 So, while 
there was sufficient discussion of evidence for us to conclude that the 
Court had evidence before it, and that it knew what it was writing about, 
the discussion was far too limited to enable us to be critical of its use 
and analysis by the Court. It is a powerful strategy that disempowers the 
lay reader, preventing an enlightened critical appraisal of the judicial 
processing of evidence.  
Certain issues with important factual components seem to be settled 
in a formalistic way. For example, the central affirmation according to 
which “[t]he distinction between the claimants and the comparator 
group was made on the basis of the claimants’ chronic pain disability, 
i.e., on the basis of disability”72 was made without any explicit connec-
tion to evidence in its support. The existence of a chronic pain disability 
is, however, of fundamental importance, and could easily have been 
                                                                                                                                
65 Id., at para. 2.  
66 Id., at para. 90.  
67 Id. 
68 Id.  
69 Id., at para. 97.  
70 Id., at para. 113. 
71 Id., at para. 109.  
72 Id., at para. 80.  
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considered as raising a crucial and controversial factual issue. Neverthe-
less it is established in only one sentence.  
The existence of a historical disadvantage is an inherently factual is-
sue, usually understood to be of central importance in equality cases. 
Yet it would have probably been difficult to establish with regard to 
chronic pain syndrome. The Court avoided the issue in Martin by refin-
ing the law. Indeed, the Court decided, as a question of law, that this 
contextual factor is neutral when “the claimants belong to a larger group 
… who have experienced historical disadvantage or stereotypes.”73 The 
Court went further by adding that where, as in the case before it, the 
criteria of lack of correspondence is at the heart of the equality analysis, 
it may render the relative disadvantage investigation inappropriate.74 
The difficulty of determining a factual issue is hereby avoided by 
changing the legal analysis.  
Interestingly, the lack of correspondence between the actual needs, 
capacities, and circumstances of chronic pain sufferers and the statutory 
treatment they are afforded is established without any requirement of an 
empirical description of the former. Indeed, the blanket exclusion from 
the general compensation scheme was found to lack the necessary corre-
spondence to the special needs and actual capacities of the claimants, 
whatever they may be. A bare formal reasoning could rationally dispose 
of this issue.  
The Court decided the dignity component of the equality rights 
analysis in a purely formalistic and abstract way. Indeed, the exclusion 
of chronic pain sufferers was construed by the Court as sending “a clear 
message that chronic pain sufferers are not equally valued and deserving 
of respect as members of Canadian society.”75 
Under the section 1 analysis, the blanket exclusion from regular 
benefits, and the comparison with other provincial statutory regimes that 
provide for more personalized treatments, were deemed sufficient to 
conclude that there had been a failure to meet the minimal impairment 
criteria.  
Martin is an equality rights case involving a particular medical con-
dition about which scientific knowledge is uncertain. The Court main-
                                                                                                                                
73 Id., at para. 88. 
74 Id., at para. 89. 
75 Id., at para. 101.  
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tained the apparent requirement of a factual foundation for constitu-
tional challenges, but in reality found ways to settle the issue despite the 
lack of necessary information. The illusion of certainty is kept alive, but 
the fiat aspect of the judicial decision cannot be mistaken.  
Discussion of social facts continued to be present in last year’s con-
stitutional cases, and the Court seems to have become bolder in its use 
of them. The Court reasons the facts or deplores their absence. It some-
times formally states them; it sometimes uses them on an ad hoc basis. 
It sometimes ignores them and rather chooses to proceed with legal 
reasoning and value judgments.  
It seems as though, after the desperate call for facts triggered by 
anxiety in the face of the enormous responsibility of applying a charter 
of rights, the Court now feels more confident. It still needs facts and will 
use them at least at a rhetorical level, but it no longer needs to make 
grandiloquent speeches about factual basis in constitutional cases. The 
Court reasserts the power to make constitutional decisions as matters of 
law and value judgments. Yet this comes with an obligation to take 
responsibility. 
III.  SOME CONFUSION BETWEEN RULES AND PROVISIONS 
Bizarre affirmations find their way into constitutional cases. Indeed, 
we will encounter the possibility of “reading in exceptions” to criminal 
offences76 (meaning to add exclusions?), or of “non-literal infringe-
ments” of constitutional rights.77 The use of such peculiar wording sug-
gests there must be something wrong in the way we think about these 
issues.  
Among other attributes, Italians have great art, great shoes and great 
food. Interestingly, they have also developed a sophisticated theory of 
constitutional law that could help us better understand judicial method-
ology.78 Some Italian authors suggest a distinction between a norm (or 
rule) — una norma79 — and the provision that expresses it — una 
                                                                                                                                
76 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3.  
77 See infra, discussion of Figueroa.  
78 I must admit here that, because of my linguistic limits, I have no direct access to 
Italian caselaw or doctrine. I have to use French texts.  
79 “[L]a norme n’est pas, à l’inverse de la disposition, une chose, mais un sens.... 
[L]’appréhension de la norme n’est possible que par une opération intellectuelle de com-
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disposizione.80 They insist on the very illuminating idea that one should 
be clear whether judicial review on constitutional grounds relates to 
rules or to statutory provisions.81  
If this confusion between a rule of law and its formal expression in a 
legislative text could be avoided, perhaps we would not have to “read 
in” exceptions, or qualify infringements of rights as being literal or non-
literal.  
Constitutional adjudication is mainly about rules. For example, 
statutory rules of law must be consistent with the rules of law flowing 
from the Constitution. If they are inconsistent, the former will be of no 
force or effect. Constitutional adjudication is therefore about rules, pos-
sible inconsistencies between them, and decisions as to which should 
prevail, and to what extent.  
A rule of law is not the same thing as the provision that articulates 
it, that is to say, its material expression in a statute.82 One should not 
confuse the two. Common law systems are founded on this distinction: 
statutory rules of law have a literal expression in Parliament’s Acts, 
while courts will declare common law rules that don’t have this kind of 
formal support.83 There are therefore some rules with no legislative 
                                                                                                                                
préhension.... L’activité d’interprétation permet donc d’extraire des dispositions les normes 
qu’elles contiennent à l’état latent.... [P]ar conséquent, la norme, c’est la disposition inter-
prétée” : Thierry Di Manno, Le juge constitutionnel et la technique des décisions « interpréta-
tives » en France et en Italie (Paris & Aix-en-Provence: Économica et Presses universitaires 
d’Aix-Marseille, Collection Droit public positif, 1997) at 51.  
80 “Par disposition, il faut entendre acte, texte ou document normatif au sens lexi-
cologique de ces termes, c’est-à-dire comme regroupant des formules linguistiques textuelles. 
... En définitive, on retiendra que la disposition est un énoncé ou une formule linguistique. 
Elle se conçoit, en dernière analyse, comme l’instrument, l’enveloppe, le contenant de la 
norme”: id., at 49-50.  
81 “L’objet du jugement de constitutionnalité repose, traditionnellement, en Italie, sur 
une distinction établie par la Cour constitutionnelle et la doctrine italiennes, entre disposition 
et norme”: Jean-Jacques Pardini,  Le juge constitutionnel et le « fait » en Italie et en France 
(Paris & Aix-en-Provence: Economica et Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, Collection 
Droit public positif, 2001) at 41.  
82 “In handling rules it can be important to realize that the substance of the rule and the 
syntax of its formulation are different matters.... We talk quite naturally of reading, drafting, 
breaking or writing down a rule.... [S]ometimes we may fall into the trap of confusing the rule 
with its physical expression.”: William Twining & David Miers, How to Do Things with 
Rules, 2d ed. (London: Wendenfield and Nicolson, 1982) at 137, 148.  
83 Twining and Miers discuss this distinction between a rule and its expression. They 
write: “First, there are rules expressed in fixed verbal form and rules not expressed in fixed 
verbal form. Some, such as statutory rules, are expressed in a particular form of words which 
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provision,84 and, conversely, some provisions that do not express a 
rule.85 A rule of law belongs to the world of meanings, of ideas, of ab-
stractions. The statutory provision that expresses it belongs to the world 
of visible signs. We can see the provision, we can read it, but we still 
have to understand the rule it expresses. It is unfortunately all too easy 
and common to confuse a rule of law with its literal expression. Yet we 
must try to avoid this confusion.  
This methodological confusion between a rule and the provision that 
formally expresses it seems to be present in recent constitutional cases. 
Figueroa fails to distinguish between the constitutional protection of 
certain democratic rights and its formal expression in section 3 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (see 1, following). It is not 
clear whether the “reading down” or “reading in” one finds discussed in 
Canadian Foundation refers to the text of section 43 of the Criminal 
Code or the rule it expresses (see 2, below).  
1. Figueroa: A “Non-Literal Infringement”? 
Confusion between a rule of constitutional law and its material ex-
pression in the text of the Constitution — in this case section 3 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — seems to underlie some 
ambiguous comments made by the Court in Figueroa. One finds in that 
case a discussion of the democratic rights protected by the Charter. The 
Court seeks to clarify that the protection provided by section 3 goes 
beyond the mere acts of voting or of declaring oneself a candidate in an 
election. It includes a right to effective representation, which can in-
volve important and diverse elements.  
The majority judgment refers to the possibility of legislation being 
“inconsistent with the express language of s. 3,”86 but insists that “Charter 
                                                                                                                                
has official status, so that it is not open to interpreters to change the wording.... Other rules ... 
may have been expressed differently at different times, may have been only partly articulated 
or may never have been expressed in words at all.”: Twining & Miers, id., at 143.  
84 For example, there is no formal provision expressing a common law rule.  
85 For example, one can think of a statutory provision providing for a definition. A 
definition is not a rule. To reconstruct the rule, one may therefore have to use more than one 
provision. 
86 Figueroa, supra, note 18, at para. 33.  
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analysis requires courts to look beyond the words of the section,”87 since 
a violation of democratic rights can result from the way “legislation 
affects the conditions in which citizens exercise those rights [to play a 
meaningful role in the electoral process].”88  
In much the same way, LeBel J. compares “literal prohibitions”89 
“directly clashing with [s. 3’s] plain language”90 with “non-literal in-
fringement of s. 3”91 “dealing with the additional protections that must 
implicitly be included if the literal language of the section is to be given 
full effect.”92 
With all due respect, I don’t think that it is useful to refer to and dis-
tinguish between literal or non-literal infringements of rights. It con-
fuses things, and it gives too much importance to the words of the 
constitutional provision. We must interpret the rule, and the scope of the 
right it protects. We must then decide whether there is, or is not, an 
infringement of the protected right. We must give meaning to the rule, 
that is, the constitutional protection of a right. The rule is expressed with 
words in a constitutional provision. The meaning held to be correct will 
perhaps be broader than the core and ordinary meaning of the words 
used.  
The supremacy of the Charter is about rules, not about words. In-
consistencies exist between rules, not between words or languages. 
There is no such thing as a “literal prohibition.” There are prohibitions, 
within a certain ambit, and they are expressed with words.  
There is no denying the enormous power exercised in the interpreta-
tion of constitutional rules. The rule is not there, pre-existent, waiting to 
be discovered and declared. The interpreter will give meaning to the 
rule, but this remains a different question.  
The point made here is that the rule and the words used to express it 
in a constitutional provision are not the same thing. The latter is only a 
material way  of expressing the former.  
                                                                                                                                
87 Id., at para. 19.  
88 Id., at para. 33.  
89 Id., at para. 126. 
90 Id.  
91 Id., at para. 178. 
92 Id., at para. 131. 
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2.  Canadian Foundation: A Case of “Reading In,” or “Reading 
Down”?  
The acknowledgement of the fundamental distinction between a rule 
and its textual expression in a legal provision can perhaps help clarify 
judicial statements about constitutional remedies. Indeed, one finds 
logical inconsistencies in the use of expressions such as “reading in” or 
“reading down,” not to mention their unpredictable French translations. 
Here, again, much seems to be lost in translation.93  
Canadian Foundation is an illustration of this confusion. Chief Jus-
tice McLachlin, writing for the majority, confirmed the constitutional 
validity of section 43 of the Criminal Code, concerning the physical 
correction of children. The conclusion rested on a very restrictive inter-
pretation of the rule expressed by section 43. Given her conclusion of 
constitutional validity, she did not have to discuss the remedial issue. 
Three dissenting judges came to the conclusion that the provision vio-
lated constitutional rights. Justice Arbour was of the view that striking 
down the provision was the appropriate remedy.94 Justice Deschamps 
discussed, but rejected, the possibility of a remedy of “reading down.”95 
Justice Binnie would have struck out of the provision the references to 
“schoolteacher” and “pupil.”96 He wrote that what he called the “exten-
sive ‘reading in’ exercise” undertaken by the Chief Justice would have 
been more properly dealt with at the remedial level.97  
So, in the hypothesis that there was a constitutional violation, was it 
a case of remedial “reading down” or of “reading in”? Can both occur at 
the same time? Or, more pragmatically, was it a case of striking out 
words?  
It all depends on whether we are discussing the rule, or the words of 
the legislative provision that express it. If we are referring to the rule 
itself, which is considered by some to be too broad since it applies to 
cases that bring about constitutional violations, then it is a case of 
                                                                                                                                
93 Danielle Pinard, “Les sanctions d’une règle de droit législative incompatible avec la 
Charte canadienne des droits et libertés: le reading in, le reading down, l’interprétation large, 
l’interprétation atténuée, etc.!” (2003) R. du B. (numéro special) 412. 
94 Canadian Foundation, supra, note 54, at para. 194.  
95 Id., at para. 243. 
96 Id., at para. 76. 
97 Id., at para. 103. 
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reading down, or limiting the scope of the rule. If, on the contrary, we 
are referring to the words of the provision that express it, it can be a case 
of reading in, that is, of adding words that limit the scope of the rule. Or 
again, as Binnie J. suggested, it could be a case of striking out words.  
The point is that we have to be clear about what we are talking 
about. Ideally, in the same community, we should share the same vo-
cabulary when we talk about things, such as constitutional remedies.  
I would suggest that the emphasis should be placed on rules, since 
they are what inconsistency is about. Inconsistency between rules is at 
the heart of constitutionalism. The manner in which a rule is semanti-
cally expressed in a statutory provision is of secondary importance. The 
semantic expression of the remedy of reading down or reading in, that 
is, the necessary modification of the wording of a statutory provision it 
may require is, in the same way, of secondary importance.98  
IV.  INTERPRETATION OR REMEDY? 
The interpretation of a statute and the imposition of a remedy for a 
constitutional violation are different steps in the constitutional adjudica-
tion process, and should be kept as such. They come into play at differ-
ent phases, involve different basic principles, and are open to different 
kinds of criticism.  
The interpretation of statutes is the ordinary day-to-day work of the 
courts. The accepted rhetoric under which this exercise occurs proceeds 
as follows: courts attempt to find Parliament’s intent as expressed in the 
wording of the statute. Courts are therefore mere interpreters of another 
state actor’s written decisions. As such, they must faithfully search and 
give effect to this other actor’s will. Parliamentary sovereignty is the 
                                                                                                                                
98 See Pinard, supra, note 93. The Italian solution is as follows: “Selon cette ligne de 
conduite, la Cour constitutionnelle rend une décision qui a pour objet la disposition de loi en 
tant que document lorsque l’on constate une correspondance univoque entre celle-ci et la 
norme que l’on déduit. En effet, dans ce cas, la norme est indissolublement liée au texte; 
l’objet de la décision ne peut, donc, être que le texte, qui ne saurait survivre, par hypothèse, à 
l’amputation de la norme. En revanche, lorsque cette correspondance entre la disposition et la 
norme est rompue, lorsque le texte ne génère pas une seule norme mais plusieurs, la décision 
constitutionnelle pourra porter sur les normes. Dans ce cas, en effet, le texte n’étant plus 
attaché à une seule norme, il pourra subir, par exemple, l’ablation d’une norme sans néces-
sairement périr avec elle. La capacité ‘normogène’ de la disposition pourra lui permettre de 
générer une norme conforme à la Constitution.”: Thierry Di Manno, supra, note 79, at 62. 
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key concept for statutory interpretation. Judicial interpretation of 
statutes will sometimes be criticized in terms of being more or less 
plausible. Its legitimacy will however rarely be put into question. Inter-
pretation is what judges do.  
The imposition of a constitutional remedy comes into play at a dif-
ferent phase of the process, and under different guiding principles. A 
remedy is imposed when a statute has been interpreted, held to be in 
violation of rights, and not justified as a reasonable limit. It is prescribed 
by the principle of the Primacy of the Constitution. It is imposed in 
violation of parliamentary intent. The legitimacy of judicial review, and 
particularly of the judicial crafting of constitutional remedies concerning 
statutes, gives rise to critical scrutiny and comments.  
The Supreme Court of Canada played an active role in muddling 
these issues when it chose to use the same words to express different 
things. I am referring here to the expressions “reading down” and “read-
ing in,” which are now used in Canadian law either to refer to interpreta-
tive devices, or to constitutional remedies.99  
At a very basic level, the reading down of statutes has always meant 
narrowing the potential meaning of words in order to respect what was 
understood to be the true legislative intent. Later on, the expression 
“reading down” was read down to mean the interpretation of a statute 
with the aim of preserving its constitutional validity, when the words 
used can in fact support such an interpretation.100 In the same way, 
“reading in” has been understood as an orthodox feature of statutory 
interpretation simply rendering the particulars of legislative intent more 
explicit.  
Since the Schachter case,101 however, reading down and reading in 
have been given new meanings. They are now the appellations of consti-
tutional remedies that allow judges to subtract or to add to statutes 
whose scope is held to be unconstitutionally too wide or too narrow.  
The same words are therefore now used to refer to true interpreta-
tion and to constitutional remedies. This confusion blurs the conceptual 
integrity of each reality.  
                                                                                                                                
99 For a critical discussion of this confusion, see Pinard, supra, note 93.  
100 See, for the classical formulation in a separation of powers case, McKay v. R., 
[1965] S.C.R. 798, at 804. For an application of this statutory interpretation principle in a 
Charter case, see, for example, R. v. Sharpe, supra, note 76, at para 33.  
101 Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68. 
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At a practical level, such confusion can be deliberate, and used in 
order to be able to remedy a statute under the guise of interpretation. 
And thereby neutralize critics of judicial activism. 
1. Canadian Foundation: To Remedy Through Interpretation? 
The Court recently gave us, in Canadian Foundation, the textbook 
material for a discussion of this issue of the distinction between inter-
preting and imposing a remedy.  
The majority wrote a statutory interpretation judgment. It inter-
preted section 43 of the Criminal Code in such a way as to enable it to 
pronounce its constitutional validity. The Court was, at the very least, 
quite inventive in interpreting the provision as not justifying, for in-
stance, physical correction of children under two years of age or of 
adolescents, or degrading, inhuman or harmful conduct, or the use of 
objects or blows or slaps to the head.102  
Three dissenting judges disagreed with the way the majority inter-
preted section 43. They would have given the provision what they con-
sidered to be its full and intended scope, and would have held it to be 
constitutionally invalid. 
Justice Binnie was of the opinion that the majority had “read signifi-
cant limitations into the scope of s. 43 protection,”103 and that “[s]uch an 
extensive ‘reading in’ exercise, if appropriate, should take place only 
after an infringement of s. 15(1) is acknowledged, and the Court turns 
to the issue of the s. 1 justification and the appropriate remedy.”104 
Justice Arbour strongly criticized what she called “the reading down 
of a statutory defence”105 undertaken by the majority, as being contrary 
to the traditional and historical role of the courts in criminal processes. 
She denounced the fact that the majority had rewritten the provision in 
order to validate it.106  
Justice Deschamps, in recognizing that there exists a principle of 
statutory interpretation that favours constitutional validity, was of the 
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opinion that the provision of the Criminal Code could not support the 
restricted scope proposed by the majority of the Court.107 She wrote that 
the Court could not “read the section down to create a constitutionally 
valid provision.”108  
I tend to agree with the dissenters. I don’t understand why the ma-
jority of the Court proceeded the way it did. It is clear that it could have 
done otherwise. Indeed, it could have held that the provision was in-
tended to be given its full literal scope, but that consequently some of its 
applications were unconstitutional and had to be read down in accor-
dance with section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This approach 
would have been more straightforward.  
The path chosen by the Court may have something to do with the 
debate about the legitimacy of judicial review.  
Judicial interpretation of statutes is legitimate, at least formally. It is 
what judges do. It is part of the magical category of so-called “questions 
of law” about which judges have the first and the last word. Judges have 
judicial notice of the law, aren’t we told? Judicial interpretation of stat-
utes attracts much less attention, concern, or interest than judicial decla-
ration of unconstitutionality of Parliament’s will. 
If the Court, as a general approach, wished to opt for an attitude of 
restraint, or at least give the appearance of such an attitude, while still 
exercising some power, the statutory interpretation technique might 
prove quite useful. The judgment of the Court in Canadian Foundation 
certainly appears to reflect an attitude of restraint. The statutory provi-
sion is held to be consistent with Charter rights. At a formal level, the 
Court is telling Parliament that it was correct, that it acted within its 
constitutional jurisdiction. Thus the Court can pretend to play a passive 
role. This is especially true since the analysis begins and ends with the 
scrutiny of the consistency between the constitutional rights and the 
statutory provision, a stage where the onus rests on the party alleging 
the violation, and not on the state. Consequently, the state will not have 
to prove anything.  
At a purely formal level, the critics of judicial activism can be satis-
fied with such a confirmation of legislative choices. Yet, to use the 
classical and useful distinction, the issue has been settled as a question 
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of law, that is, the proper interpretation of the statutory provision. This 
is a field where the Court can exercise full sovereignty. Within this 
formal attitude of restraint, the Court will therefore decide what should 
be the correct scope of the justification provided by the Criminal Code. 
And, as Arbour J. wrote, a lot of work will be required to make the 
provision constitutionally sound.109 Hence, precise and effective judicial 
activism will be exercised with the appearances of a very passive and 
humble attitude of deference for legislative choices.  
The confusion between interpretation and remedy can thus be useful 
for the judges.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Judicial activism at the methodological level is a defining feature of 
Canadian constitutional adjudication. The way the Court is going about 
its business is sometimes mysterious.  
The handling of facts seems to some extent unpredictable. Rules of 
law and their textual expression in provisions are sometimes confused. 
Remedial work is done in the guise of interpretation.  
Uncertainty in the methodological approach allows the Court to ex-
ercise an important and relatively hidden power.  
The confirmation of the constitutional validity of a statutory provi-
sion can formally be seen as a manifestation of judicial restraint. How-
ever, emphasis on methodology reveals that in reality it is an act of 
activism when the confirmed rule is a judicially rewritten one.  
I understand that conceptual elegance is not everything. And I ac-
cept that logical consistency must not trump other values. But still, 
communication within a particular community requires some shared and 
plausible meanings.  
The need for flexible rules for facts should not become the justifica-
tion for arbitrariness. 
A rule is not a written text.  
To interpret is not to remedy.  
To stay within its institutional boundaries does perhaps mean that 
the Court must make use of intelligible tools.  
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